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Abstract
The Mexican government has recently launched several initiatives aimed at increasing the use of formal
financial services, under the implicit assumption that they allow households to smooth consumption
and finance investment in human capital. This study seeks to determine what is the impact of the
use of formal financial services, proxied by the use of credit cards, on the level and distribution of
household consumption in Mexico. Using data from the 2010 household income and expenditure survey,
an instrumental variables approach is used in the context of quantile regressions, to correct for the bias
that stems from households’ self–selection in the decision to use formal financial services. The results
indicate that financial services increase consumption of those households that use them, and that this
effect is strongest for households in the lowest quantiles, thus reducing inequality of consumption across
households.
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1 Introduction
The modeling of consumer choice under uncertainty habitually invokes one of two polar cases: that of
the representative agent where, under the assumption of complete markets, consumers can buy insurance
against the occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks in all states of nature; or the permanent income hypothesis,
where consumers must self–insure. In both cases the demand for insurance stems from the assumption
that consumers are risk–averse and thus wish to smooth consumption across time. However, as reviewed by
Guvenen (2011), the empirical evidence rejects both polar cases in favour of a partial insurance model, where
access to insurance markets in particular, and formal financial services in general, is segmented according to
household characteristics.
The recently published Financial Inclusion Survey (INEGI and CNBV, 2012) confirms the segmentation
in the market for formal financial services in Mexico. According to the survey, only 35.5% of the adult
population save at formal financial institutions, while 43.7% use informal savings mechanisms. Considering
that 17.5% of adults use both formal and informal saving services, the results imply that 38.3% of adults in
Mexico do not save.
This relatively low level of utilisation of formal financial services is also observed in the credit market,
where only 27.5% of adults rely on credit from formal financial service providers; as well as in the insurance
market, where less than a quarter of adults report having bought insurance. This explains why, according
to the survey results, in the case of emergencies the main source of funds is borrowing amongst individuals.
The Mexican government, through its banking supervision authority recently launched a financial in-
clusion initiative (CNBV, 2012) whose objective is to encourage the provision of financial services to those
segments of the population which are currently unbanked. This has been complemented by the recently
approved financial reform which, among other things, aims at lowering the cost of wholesale financial ser-
vices. Despite the importance assigned to the increased use of formal financial services, to date we are not
aware of any study of the impact of access and use of formal financial services on household consumption
and inequality.
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap, by exploring the impact of the use of formal financial
services on the distribution of household consumption in Mexico. Given the restrictions of the data from
the 2010 edition of the household income and expenditure survey (INEGI, 2011), use of formal financial
services are proxied by the use of credit cards by households in the month preceding the survey. Since in
principle we are interested in access to the use of financial services, but the data only reflects it usage, and
considering that that use of credit card is an endogenous household decision, in order to estimate its impact
on the inequality of household consumption, we adopt an instrumental variable identification strategy in
the context of quantile regressions. In particular we use the estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2002) to
estimate the impact of credit card use on household consumption across its distribution, where we use the
exogenous variation in the level of margination across households, and the years of education of its head to
account for selection bias.
While the identification strategy does not allow us to estimate the impact of credit card use for the
population at large, it allows us to estimate its effect on the consumption, and its distribution, of the
households which use credit cards. In the language of potential outcomes the identification strategy allows
us to recover the treatment effect on the treated. The evidence found indicates that the use of credit
cards increases household monetary expenditures across the distribution. However, the relative increase is
highest for those households in the lowest quantiles, and its effect decreases monotonically with the level
household consumption until it is impossible to distinguish its effect from zero from around the 65th quantile
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onwards. Thus we conclude that the use of formal financial services not only has a positive effect on the
level of monetary expenditure of households across the distribution, but it also reduces the inequality of
households’ consumption. This effect is in line with the effect of financial development and inequality found
by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) using cross–country data.
The rest of the document is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the relationship
between financial services and household inequality, where it is stressed that although the theoretical evidence
is ambiguous with respect to the sign of the relationship, the empirical evidence in general supports the
notion that financial services can reduce inequality. Next, section 3 discusses the details of the empirical
identification strategy. Section 4 discusses the main features of the data, with particular emphasis of the
differences in characteristics of those households which use credit cards and those which do not. The results
are discussed in section 5, and finally section 6 concludes with a discussion of possible extensions of the
analysis.
2 Financial Services and Inequality
A useful way to organise the literature on the channels through which access to formal financial services
affect household consumption inequality, is to follow the approach of Coibion et al. (2012) and focus on the
channels through which monetary policy shocks are transmitted to households.
In an environment of segmented access to formal financial services, households from the lower quan-
tiles will hold a higher proportion of their financial assets in cash as in Algan and Ragot (2010). Thus,
expansionary policy shocks that result in higher inflation will affect the poor disproportionately, increasing
inequality as in Albanesi (2007) and Erosa and Ventura (2002). This effect will be further accentuated to
the extent that richer households benefit from expansionary policy shocks, through their access to financial
intermediation services, as in the models of Ledoit (2011) and Williamson (2008).
On the other hand, if as in the model of Doepke and Schneider (2006), higher inflation results in transfers
from savers, which generally exhibit higher levels of income and consumption, to debtors, expansionary policy
shocks could in principle reduce inequality. However, considering that debtor households tend to be found
in the middle of the distribution, while poorer households have limited access to formal financial services
(Figueroa, 2011), it is not clear what would be the aggregate effect of this channel on inequality.
From an intergenerational perspective, Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) and Galor and Zeira (1993),
among others, argue that reductions in the financial system imperfections, such as improved access, reduce
inequality by enabling household investment in human capital. This effect is further reinforced when, as
in the model of Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), access to formal financial services expand the opportunity set
available to face adverse shocks. In contrast, if improved access to and quality of formal financial services
increases the intensity of use of those who already have access to it, as in the model of Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), its benefits would be enjoyed mainly by richer households, accentuating inequality.
In their review of the empirical literature, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) conclude that financial
development benefits households from lower quantiles disproportionately, reducing both the level and per-
sistence of inequality. Moreover, they find that most of the effect operates indirectly, such as through the
impact of better financial services of the creation of employment opportunities as in Beck et al. (2008).
Considering the priority assigned to increased financial access and use by the Mexican government CNBV
(2012), the study of its impact on the level of household consumption and its distribution is relevant for the
design and evaluation of public policy.
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3 Identification Strategy
In principle, if access to and use of formal financial services was randomly assigned, its impact on the level of
consumption could be measured by comparing the difference in the means of household expenditures between
the group that was assigned access C1i , and the group that was not C
0
i .
However, in practice, neither the access nor the use of formal financial services is distributed randomly.
Instead it depends on household characteristics. Moreover, access is only observed through the use of financial
services. The main challenge for the identification of the impact of formal financial services on households’
consumption, and its distribution, is the fact that the utilisation of financial services is the result of an
endogenous household decision. This self–selection problem has been widely studied in the literature (Vella,
1998). Before discussing the identification strategy, it is useful to analyse the following model, in order to
understand the origin of the bias caused by self–selection:
Ci = X
′
iβ + δDi + εi (1)
Di =
{
1, if D∗i > 0;
0, otherwise
(2)
D∗i = W
′
iγ + νi (3)
where (1) is the output equation, where observed expenditures are determined as a function of the observable
characteristics’ vector X, with coefficients β, and the binary indicator Di, which takes the value of one when
the household decides to make use of formal financial services, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest
is δ, which measures the impact of formal financial services use on consumption.
As detailed in equations (2) and (3), the utilisation of financial services depends on the value of an
unobserved variable D∗i , which is in turn assumed to be determined by the observable variable vector Wi
with coefficients γ.
The selection bias occurs when the innovations εi and νi are not orthogonal, which imply that Di is
endogenous. This can happen when, for example, the households with a more prosperous outlook are more
likely to use credit cards. Since the evaluation of the households’ outlook is necessarily subjective, and thus
unobservable, the errors εi and νi will not be independent.
As stressed by Puhani (2000), the most common approach in the empirical literature to solve for selection
bias, is to use a variant of Heckman’s two–step estimator (Heckman, 1976, 1979). However, as discussed by
Angrist (2001), in order to recover the causal effect of a given treatment, such as use of financial services, on
the distribution of an outcome variable such as household expenditures, it is not necessary to impose all the
restrictions needed to identify the parameters of Heckman’s two–step estimator and its variants. Instead,
he proposes the adoption of an instrumental variables approach to solve for the endogeneity of the regressor
Di.
In view of the above, and considering that the primary objective is to estimate the impact of the use
of formal financial services on the distribution of household consumption, the quantile treatment effect
(QTE henceforth) estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2002) is used. The QTE estimator generalises the
traditional quantile regression estimator of Koenker and Bassett (1978), under the assumption that there
exists a binary variable Zi, that is a valid instrument for the endogenous regressor Di.
4
The QTE estimator is given by:
(βˆq, δˆq) = arg min
β,δ
E[κiρq(Ci −Xiβ′ − δDi)] (4)
where the function ρq(e) = (q − ι[e < 0])e determines the asymmetric absolute loss function, while the
weights ki are given by:
κi = 1− Di(1− Zi)
1− P (Zi = 1|Xi) −
(1−Di)Zi
P (Zi = 1|Xi) (5)
It is readily verified that traditional quantile regression estimator is a special case of the QTE when
Di = Zi. In this sense, the relationship between both quantile estimators is analogous to that between least
squares and instrumental variables.
Up to this point, the interest of the discussion has been the contrast between the consumption of house-
holds that use formal financial services, and those who do not use them. However, there are households that
have access to formal financial services but decide not to make use of them, as well as households that would
make use of them but do not have access. The relationship between the regressor Di, and its instrument Zi
in the QTE regressor allows us to identify these different households separately.
As discussed, Di reflects the decision by households to use formal financial services. As is well known, a
valid instrument must be relevant, in the case of interest it must be related to the decision to use financial
services, but otherwise must be independent of the outcome variable. That is it must be unrelated to house-
hold expenditures, except through its effect on the decision to use financial services. Thus, the instrument Zi
can be interpreted, precisely, as a binary variable that determines whether a household has access to formal
financial services.
With this notation, it is possible to separately identify households that have access and make use of
formal financial services (Di = 1, Zi = 1), from those that have access to financial services but decide not to
use them (Di = 0, Zi = 1), and those that do not have access to the formal financial system and thus can
not make use of its services (Di = 0, Zi = 0)
1.
Without going into their details, its important to note that the function of the weights ki is to identify,
on average, those households that have access to formal financial services and decide to make use of them.
In the language of treatment effects, the QTE estimator allows us to identify the average impact of the
treatment on the treated. That is it measures the impact of using financial services on the population that
has access to the formal financial system, and decides to use its services.
In order to use the estimator, it is necessary to estimate the weights ki. The problem is that when
Di 6= Zi, the value of some of the weights can be negative, which makes the minimisation problem posed
in (4) non–convex. In practice, the expectation of ki is computed, conditional on the matrix of observed
regressors, which is equivalent to computing the following probability:
Pr[D1i > D
0
i |Ci, Di, X] = 1−
Di(1− E[Zi|Yi, Di = 1, Xi])
1− P (Zi = 1|Xi) −
(1−Di)E[Zi|Yi, Di = 0, Xi])
P (Zi = 1|Xi) (6)
4 Data
The analysis uses data drawn from the 2010 wave of the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure
Survey (ENIGH as it is known in Spanish). In particular, the sample studied focuses on monetary income
1Given the institutional restrictions, in this context it is not possible to observe households that despite not having access
to formal financial services, make use of them (Di = 1, Zi = 0).
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and expenditure of households headed by individuals aged between 25 and 65 years.
While the recently published data from the Financial Inclusion Survey, contain a rich characterisation
of the use of different financial services by Mexican households, the survey does not include data on expen-
ditures. Thus we proxy the use of financial services by the use of credit cards in the month preceding the
household income and expenditure survey. Once the data for the 2012 wave of the Household Income and
Expenditure Survey are made available a more nuanced analysis of both access and use of different financial
services will be possible.
Table 12 presents summary statistics at the national, urban and rural level3. The first four columns
summarize the socioeconomic characteristics of households at the national level. There it can be seen that
the median household is headed by a married male aged 44, who does not identify himself as belonging to
an indigenous group, and who with 12 years of formal schooling –including preschool– just finished middle
school. He is employed full-time in the private sector and does not receive social security benefits, which
implies he works in the informal sector. The median household is composed of a single family group with
four members, owns its house, is located in an urban4 municipality classified by the National Population
Council (CONAPO), as having a very low margination index5, and does not receive government transfers.
Median monetary income in 2010 was 18,752.52 Mexican Pesos, which is equivalent to 1,488.3 US dollars,
while monetary expenditures amount to 17,264.16 pesos –approximately 1,370 dollars–, which implies that
the median household save 6.4% of their monetary income. Discounting rent the median household savings
rise to 9.3% of monetary income, and further discounting education and health expenditures, its savings are
equivalent to 17.6% of monetary income. Moreover, only 21% of households are situated in locations with
less than 2,500 inhabitants, and at the national level only 11.3% used a credit card on the month preceding
the survey.
The next set of columns presents summary statistics for urban and rural households. While the households
in these two groups differ in several dimensions, most notably in the level of income and consumption, for
the purposes of this investigation, the salient difference is the use of credit cards. Whereas credit card use
amongst urban households reach 14%, above the national mean of 11%, among rural households only 2% of
households use credit cards.
As discussed below, since credit card use is based on an endogenous decision by the household, it is
not possible to identify the impact of its use on household consumption and its distribution for the whole
population. Instead it is only possible to estimate its impact for households which use credit cards. In
other words the counterfactual studies is what would happen to the consumption level and distribution of
households which use credit cards, if they did not use them. Considering the very low level of use of credit
cards among rural households, in the rest of the document we restrict our attention to urban households.
Table 2 summarises the socioeconomic characteristics of urban households depending on whether they
use credit cards or not. In terms of the characteristics of the head of the household, the most prominent
difference is that, on average, those who use credit cards are more educated, more likely to work in the
formal sector (as proxied by whether they receive social security benefits), and less likely to work in family
owned enterprises. In terms of the characteristics of the household, those who use credit cards tend to be
2Tables and figures are presented in annex A.
3Unless otherwise noted all summary statistics and results were computed taking into account the survey’s complex design.
4Following the convention adopted by the Mexican statistical institute (INEGI), a household is considered urban if its
location has at least 2,500 inhabitants.
5CONAPO’s margination index classifies municipalities based on the incidence of illiteracy, the level of access to improved
sanitation facilities, the overcrowding of living areas, the proportion of households with dirt floors, the percentage of the
population living in locations with less than 5,000 inhabitans, and the proportion of the population that earns up to twice the
minimum wage. For further reference see (CONAPO, 2011, Annex C.)
6
located in municipalities with lower margination indices, and are less likely to receive government transfers.
Finally, concerning households finances, both income and consumption of households which use credit cards
are significantly greater than those who do not, although in both groups there is a wide dispersion of income
and expenditure.
With respect to inequality of consumption between households, whereas the Gini index of (log) monetary
expenditures of households who use credit cards is 0.30, the corresponding Gini index of households who
do not use credit cards is 0.34. Moreover the difference of 0.04 is statistically significant. This finding is
confirmed in figure 1, which shows the difference in Lorenz curves for both groups, there it can be seen that
the Lorenz curve of the households which use credit cards dominates the curve of those that do not. That
is the inequality of consumption is greater for households who do not use credit cards across all quantiles,
although it seems to be more acute for the highest quantiles.
If this difference could be attributed to the use of credit cards, then it would be evidence that their use
enables households to smooth consumption. The next section explores whether this is the case.
5 Results
Although the primary interest is to study the impact of credit card use on the distribution of household
consumption, it is relevant to study the impact on mean consumption as it completes the picture of the role
of the use of credit cards in the determination of consumption. Moreover, it allows us to explore which of
the variables listed in table 1 are relevant for the subsequent analysis.
This section begins exploring how much of the difference in consumption, and its distribution, between
the two groups of households is explained by the difference in their characteristics, next we explore the
impact of the use of credit cards on mean household consumption, and then we proceed to study its effect
on consumption inequality.
5.1 Decompositions
5.1.1 Oaxaca–Blinder Decomposition
As was discussed in section 4 the characteristics of urban households that use and do not use credit cards
are very different. To examine how much of the observed difference in mean consumption reflects observable
household characteristics we use the decomposition proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
The basic idea is to decompose the observed difference in expenditures into differences in the household
characteristics, and differences of the impact of those characteristics on expenditures. In a regression frame-
work this translates into differences of the matrix of observable regressors, and differences in its coefficients.
If we were confident that household expenditures are completely determined by the matrix of observable
regressors, we could conclude that the difference not explained by the difference of observable characteristics
across groups, is due to difference in its coefficients. However as is well know, if a relevant regressor is
omitted, then the coefficients will be biased, so that the unexplained difference will be due to differences
in coefficients as well as differences between the error terms. Despite this, if the unexplained difference is
statistically significant, the evidence can be interpreted as indicating a role for the use of credit cards in
accounting for the difference in household consumption across groups.
In order to identify the relevant explanatory variables from the list of variables summarised in table 1,
as well as the squares of continuous variables, we used a general to specific approach based on the algorithm
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proposed by Hendry and Krolzig (2001)6.
Table 3 shows the results of the Oaxaca–Blinder decompositions. The top panel summarises the mean of
(log) monetary expenditure for both groups, and its difference; while the bottom panel provides details of the
difference decomposition. The difference between the columns stems from the coefficients that are used form
reference. In the first column the reference coefficients are those from a pooled regression of observations
from both groups, whereas in the second and third column, respectively, the reference coefficients are those
of the group which uses credit cards, and those who do not.
The first feature to note is the magnitude of the difference, which amounts to almost 0.7 log points.
Irrespective of the coefficients used as reference a sizeable proportion of this difference is attributable to
differences in observable characteristics, with the most relevant one being the (log) of household income.
Nevertheless, we can see that when the pooled coefficients and the coefficients for the households who do
not use credit cards are used as reference, the unexplained difference is statistically significant. That is even
accounting for observable differences, the evidence suggests that the use of credit cards does have a positive
impact on mean (log) household consumption.
5.1.2 DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux Decomposition
To explore whether the use of credit cards also impinge on the distribution of household consumption, in this
subsection we use the decomposition proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) (DFL henceforth). The intuition
behind the DFL decomposition is to compare the observed distribution of (log) monetary expenditure of
households which use credit cards with the distribution of an appropriate counterfactual.
The simplest counterfactual would be the distribution of the same group of households if they did not
use credit cards. Of course this is not observed, so DFL suggest estimating the propensity of using credit
cards by the different households based on observable characteristics. In particular, the DFL decomposition
is implemented by first estimating a probit regression7, and then using the predicted probability of not using
a credit card to build the counterfactual.
Figure 2 shows the results of the DFL decomposition. The left panel contrasts the density of the distri-
bution of (log) monetary expenditures for households which use credit cards (solid line), with the density of
consumption of household which do not use credit cards (dashed line). In addition it plots the density of
the counterfactual (dotted line). We can see that when the households which use credit cards are weighted
by the relative probability of not using credit cards, the density shifts left and perhaps counterintuitively it
seems to become more concentrated.
The panel on the right shows the difference between the density of households which use credit cards and
its counterfactual. We can see that at least for (log) expenditures larger than 10 –or roughly the median
expenditure of urban households– the difference in densities is statistically significant. That is, even after
controlling for observable differences, the evidence implies that credit card use also affects the distribution
of household consumption.
6The basic idea behind the procedure is to progressively eliminate all variables that are not statistically significant, while
not rejecting a standard set of regression diagnostics.
7As was the case in the choice of explanatory variables for the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, the choice of explanatory
variables in the probit regression followed a general to specific reduction procedure based on the algorithm proposed by Hendry
and Krolzig (2001)
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5.2 Impact on mean household expenditures
As discussed in section 3 least square coefficients are likely to be contaminated by selection bias. Nevertheless
they serve as a useful benchmark to compare the results of instrumental variable regression.
The first column of table 4 shows the least squares estimates for the preferred specification. The F
statistic, in the bottom panel, indicates that the regression is statistically significant with a coefficient of
determination of 95.5%. With the exception of the coefficients for household size, and the indicator of
whether the household is composed of a nuclear family, the rest of the coefficients are significant at the
conventional levels.
According to least square estimates, the most important determinant of household expenditures is its
income level, which as expected has a positive sign, followed by household savings, which have a positive
impact on consumption but at a marginally decreasing rate, as evidenced by the negative sign in the square
of household savings. The negative sign of the proportion of business income as a proportion of household
monetary income, is most likely due to the fact that most family or independently owned businesses in
Mexico are very small, very likely to be located in the informal sector, and characterised by relatively low
productivity levels OECD and ECLAC (2012). However, this is at odds with the negative sign of the indicator
of whether the household head is an employee, as opposed to working independently or being an employer.
Although, not statistically significant in this specification, the coefficient of household size, which indicate
that larger households have higher expenditures but at a marginally decreasing rate, seem to point towards
the existence of economies of scale within households. The positive coefficient for the indicator of whether
the household is composed of a nuclear family, seems to support this hypothesis. The negative sign on the
indicator of whether households own their home reflects the fact that the implicit reference household under
this specification, has to pay monthly rent thus incurring in higher expenditures. Finally, the use of credit
card apparently enable households to increase their expenditure level by 3,4%.
The next four columns in table 4 show the estimates using instrumental variables. Before discussing the
coefficients it is important to discuss the rationale for the choice of the instruments for the use of credit
cards. As discussed previously a valid instrument must be related to the use of credit cards, but must affect
household expenditures only through it relationship with credit card use. Since what is observed is credit
card use and not access to their use, a natural instrument would be to look for differences in household
characteristics which are related to access to financial services. To do so we started with a list of variables
which are statistically significant in a probit regression of credit card use, but redundant in a least squares
regression of household expenditures, such as the one just described.
This set of variables includes whether the household head receives social security benefits, which is a proxy
for whether the head works in the formal sector; the set of binary variables for levels of margination which,
considering that we control for household income level, are interpreted as being proxies for ease of access
to financial services providers; and years of schooling. In the case of the first few variables, both anecdotal
evidence as well as the results from the financial inclusion survey (INEGI and CNBV, 2012) indicate that
both the ability to show proof of income, hindered by working in the informal sector, as well as physical
access to financial service providers, hindered by margination, are important obstacles to financial service
access. With respect to years of schooling, as discussed by Dick and Jaroszek (2013) financial literacy is
found to be a significant covariate in the rational use of financial services8, thus it is likely that households
whose heads are more financially literate, have a better financial history and thus are more likely to have
8In particular, Dick and Jaroszek (2013) find that households in Germany whose head has more schooling are less likely to
use current account loans, which are more expensive than other types of credit.
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access to formal financial services than those household whose head is less financially literate.
The second column shows the estimates of two stage least squares, when the full set of instruments just
discussed is used to account for the endogeneity of the use of credit cards, whereas the results in column
three correspond to the case where redundant instruments are dropped from the specification. From column
three, we can see that while the main coefficients (income and saving) remain relatively unchanged, the
coefficient of credit card use jumps to over 38%, signalling a significant selection bias in the least square
estimation. In the bottom panel, we can see that while both the Kleinbergen and Paap (2006) test for
underidentification, and the Hansen–Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions reject the hypothesis that
instruments are irrelevant, according to the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, the instruments used in
column 2 are only weakly correlated with the use of credit cards. Although when redundant instruments are
dropped, as in column three, the weakness of the instruments is attenuated, the diagnostics suggest that an
estimator that is robust to weak identification would be preferred.
Columns four and five of table 4 show the results using a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood
Estimator, where in contrast to the two stage least squares just described, we fail to reject the hypothesis
of irrelevance of the instruments, and we reject the hypothesis of instrument weakness. As before, column
four uses the full set of instruments, while column five only uses non redundant instruments. The results in
column five are our preferred specification, where importantly for our analysis the use of credit cards have
a positive and significant impact on the level of household expenditures. In fact the evidence suggests that
credit card use increases household consumption by roughly 40%. In the next section we explore how is this
impact distributed across households with different consumption levels.
5.3 Impact on the distribution of household expenditures
One of the limitations of the QTE estimator is that the instrument Zi must be a binary variable, thus we
need to combine the chosen instruments – household’s head years of schooling, and a binary indicator of
whether the household is located in a municipality with a moderate level of margination – into a single
binary variable.
The first step is to transform years of schooling into a binary indicator of whether the household head
finished high school or not. Since years of schooling have a positive impact on the probability of using a
credit card, but the level of margination has a negative sign, the binary instrument is defined as the product
of the indicator for high school and the indicator of whether the household is located in a municipality with
a very low margination index.
Using this binary instrument we use the QTE estimator to find estimates for each quantile of the distribu-
tion of household expenditures, using the specification detailed in table 5 where the results are summarised
by decile. We can see that once we estimate the results using quantile regressions, the only variables that are
significant across the distribution are household monetary income, savings, the square of savings and credit
card use.
The first relevant finding is that the impact of household income on consumption is declining in the level
of household expenditures. This is easily explained by the fact that richer households tend to save more as
a proportion of their income, than poorer households.
In line with the previous result, the coefficients on savings and credit card use are also declining with
household income. This is consistent with the idea the households from the lower quantiles are more prone to
idiosyncratic shocks, so that the availability of savings and credit allow them to increase their expenditures
given their monetary income.
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Figure 3 shows the coefficient for credit card use, as well as its 95% confidence interval across the
distribution. We can see that its impact is positive for all households up to about the 65th quantile, where
according to the estimates it becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, its impact is
highest for households from the lowest quantiles, reaching almost 70% in the first deciles, and declining
to approximately 13% for the median household. The fact that the effect is monotonically decreasing is
interpreted as supporting the notion that access and use of formal financial services can reduce the inequality
of consumption across households.
6 Conclusions
While the results indicate that credit card use can account for the lower Gini index of consumption of
those households that use credit cards, the results must be interpreted with caution. On the first hand, the
estimates measure the impact on expenditure of those household which use credit cards, in other word they
measure how much lower would the expenditure of households who use credit cards would be if they did not
use credit cards, so the results are relevant to this subset of the population and not to the population at
large.
Secondly, the use of credit cards is a relatively narrow proxy for the use of formal financial services in
general. For example for households from the lowest quantiles of the sample, a more relevant question would
be to ask what is the effect of being able to save at a formal financial institution instead of using informal
services or keeping cash at home. Considering this, a natural extension of this study would be to use data
from the Financial Inclusion Survey, with data from the 2012 wave of the Household Income and Expenditure
Survey, which at the time of writing is not available to the public.
Moreover, it is necessary to explore the robustness of the results presented to different specifications. In
particular robustness needs to be verified along three particular lines.
The first is to the choice of sample used, in particular for the results across the distribution, whose
standard errors where obtained asymptotically. A semiparametric procedure could be used to explore the
sensitivity of the functional forms used to estimate the weights of the QTE estimator. Additionally, instead
of reporting standard errors derived from asymptotic theory, it would be useful to check the significance of
estimates under bootstrapped errors.
The second is to the measure of income and expenditure. In this sense a natural check would be to verify
the robustness of results to the use of current income and expenditure. Finally, the third line would be to
use different specifications, in particular the inclusion of information on the financial assets of the household
to check whether the increase in consumption is sustainable, or it is merely deteriorating the sustainability
of household finances by indebting them beyond their means.
Finally, once the robustness of results has been ascertained, it would be interesting to explore whether
the coefficients have changed over time, and if they have whether these changes correspond to changes in
public policy or to market developments.
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A Tables and figures
A.1 Tables
Full Sample Urban Households Rural Households
Standard Number of Standard Number of Standard Number of
Mean Median Deviation observations Mean Median Deviation observations Mean Median Deviation observations
Household head
Female 0.23 0 0.42 22,192 0.25 0 0.43 17,439 0.16 0 0.37 4,753
Age 45.00 44 11.00 22,192 45.00 45 11.00 17,439 44.00 43 11.00 4,753
Years of schooling 11.41 12 5.48 22,192 12.34 12 5.34 17,439 8.00 9 4.59 4,753
Ethnicity 0.29 0 0.45 22,192 0.25 0 0.43 17,439 0.45 0 0.50 4,753
Married 0.59 1 0.49 22,192 0.58 1 0.49 17,439 0.64 1 0.48 4,753
Employer 0.14 0 0.34 19,058 0.11 0 0.31 14,888 0.23 0 0.42 4,170
Independent worker 0.15 0 0.36 19,058 0.13 0 0.34 14,888 0.23 0 0.42 4,170
Employee 0.71 1 0.46 19,058 0.75 1 0.43 14,888 0.53 1 0.50 4,170
Works full time 0.88 1 0.32 19,058 0.89 1 0.31 14,888 0.84 1 0.37 4,170
Social Security 0.44 0 0.50 22,192 0.51 1 0.50 17,439 0.18 0 0.38 4,753
Independent, personal or 0.41 0 0.49 13,534 0.37 0 0.48 11,288 0.61 1 0.49 2,246
family owned enterprise
Private sector enterprise 0.38 0 0.49 13,534 0.40 0 0.49 11,288 0.26 0 0.44 2,246
Government Institution 0.19 0 0.40 13,534 0.21 0 0.41 11,288 0.12 0 0.33 2,246
Institution not managed 0.02 0 0.13 13,534 0.02 0 0.13 11,288 0.01 0 0.09 2,246
by the government
Household characteristics
Household size 4.00 4 2.00 22,192 4.00 4 2.00 17,439 5.00 4 2.00 4,753
Very high margination index 0.06 0 0.24 22,192 0.02 0 0.13 17,439 0.21 0 0.41 4,753
High margination index 0.13 0 0.33 22,192 0.07 0 0.26 17,439 0.31 0 0.46 4,753
Moderate margination 0.13 0 0.33 22,192 0.10 0 0.31 17,439 0.22 0 0.41 4,753
Low margination 0.14 0 0.35 22,192 0.14 0 0.35 17,439 0.14 0 0.35 4,753
Very low margination 0.54 1 0.50 22,192 0.66 1 0.47 17,439 0.12 0 0.32 4,753
Nuclear 0.69 1 0.46 22,192 0.68 1 0.47 17,439 0.72 1 0.45 4,753
Own house 0.72 1 0.45 21,796 0.68 1 0.47 17,097 0.87 1 0.34 4,699
Receive government transfers 0.24 0 0.43 22,192 0.14 0 0.34 17,439 0.62 1 0.48 4,753
Rural 0.21 0 0.41 22,192
Household finances
Monetary income 27,791.88 18,752.52 34,523.17 22,192 31,149.35 21,698.86 36,260.54 17,439 15,473.12 10,293.72 23,402.36 4,753
Monetary expenditures 24,269.27 17,264.16 26,408.48 22,192 27,224.83 19,650.44 28,428.45 17,439 13,425.14 10,487.75 11,891.14 4,753
Savings 3,522.61 1,204.57 23,116.55 22,192 3,924.52 1,618.34 24,035.47 17,439 2,047.98 238.85 19,305.94 4,753
Savings 4,252.18 1,741.34 23,079.85 22,192 4,842.47 2,267.77 23,971.52 17,439 2,086.37 257.98 19,309.74 4,753
(excl. housing exp.)
Savings (excl. housing, 7,189.39 3,295.55 24,141.31 22,192 8,211.44 4,168.08 25,111.92 17,439 3,439.44 1,021.29 19,738.23 4,753
schooling and health exp.)
Business income/ 0.14 0 0.28 22,100 0.13 0 0.28 17,374 0.17 0 0.28 4,726
Monetary income
Use credit card 0.11 0 0.32 22,192 0.14 0 0.34 17,439 0.02 0 0.15 4,753
Table 1 – Summary Statistics of Household’s Socioeconomic Characteristics
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expenditure
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Do not use credit card Use credit card
Standard Number of Standard Number of
Mean Median Deviation observations Mean Median Deviation observations
Household head
Female 0.25 0 0.43 15,033 0.23 0 0.42 2,406
Age 45.00 45 11.00 15,033 46.00 46 10.00 2,406
Years of schooling 11.76 12 5.22 15,033 15.94 18 4.62 2,406
Ethnicity 0.26 0 0.44 15,033 0.19 0 0.40 2,406
Married 0.57 1 0.50 15,033 0.65 1 0.48 2,406
Employer 0.11 0 0.31 12,763 0.12 0 0.33 2,125
Independent worker 0.14 0 0.35 12,763 0.09 0 0.28 2,125
Employee 0.75 1 0.43 12,763 0.78 1 0.41 2,125
Works full time 0.89 1 0.31 12,763 0.92 1 0.27 2,125
Social Security 0.47 0 0.50 15,033 0.73 1 0.45 2,406
Independent, personal or 0.40 0 0.49 9,613 0.19 0 0.39 1,675
family owned enterprise
Private sector enterprise 0.40 0 0.49 9,613 0.43 0 0.49 1,675
Government Institution 0.18 0 0.39 9,613 0.35 0 0.48 1,675
Institution not managed 0.01 0 0.12 9,613 0.04 0 0.20 1,675
by the government
Household characteristics
Household size 4.00 4 2.00 15,033 4.00 4 2.00 2,406
Very high margination index 0.02 0 0.14 15,033 0.00 0 0.05 2,406
High margination index 0.08 0 0.28 15,033 0.02 0 0.14 2,406
Moderate margination 0.11 0 0.32 15,033 0.05 0 0.22 2,406
Low margination 0.15 0 0.35 15,033 0.12 0 0.32 2,406
Very low margination 0.64 1 0.48 15,033 0.81 1 0.39 2,406
Nuclear 0.67 1 0.47 15,033 0.71 1 0.45 2,406
Own house 0.67 1 0.47 14,717 0.74 1 0.44 2,380
Receive government 0.15 0 0.36 15,033 0.04 0 0.20 2,406
transfers
Household finances
Monetary income 26,527.62 19,609.49 27,884.26 15,033 60,026.56 44,110.59 60,875.88 2,406
Monetary expenditures 23,336.92 17,971.45 20,907.22 15,033 51,517.05 37,673.82 49,426.11 2,406
Savings 3,190.70 1,348.62 20,335.71 15,033 8,509.51 4,931.25 39,744.36 2,406
Savings (excl. 4,002.77 2,019.13 20,387.42 15,033 10,089.03 6,047.00 39,200.04 2,406
housing exp.)
Savings (excl. housing, 6,734.03 3,665.71 20,791.79 15,033 17,442.46 10,730.51 42,088.96 2,406
schooling and health exp.)
Business income/ 0.14 0 0.29 14,973 0.10 0 0.24 2,401
Monetary income
Table 2 – Summary Statistics of Urban Households by Use of Credit Cards
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expenditure
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Dependent Variable: (log) Household monetary expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
Differential
Do not use credit card 9.829 9.829 9.829
(1135.47)*** (1136.36)*** (1136.36)***
Use credit card 10.5194 10.5194 10.5194
(524.98)*** (523.21)*** (523.21)***
Difference -0.6904 -0.6904 -0.6904
(-31.63)*** (-31.54)*** (-31.54)***
Decomposition
Explained -0.657 -0.6848 -0.651
(-31.24)*** (-29.47)*** (-30.97)***
Unexplained -0.0334 -0.0056 -0.0395
(-5.81)*** (-0.54) (-5.87)***
N 6704 6704 6704
z statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3 – Oaxaca–Blinder Decomposition
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expen-
diture
Note: On the first column the pooled coefficients are used as the reference coefficients while in the second and
third columns, the coefficients from households who use and do not use credit cards, respectively, are used as
the reference coefficients. In the estimation the explanatory variables were (log) monetary income, (log) savings
and its square, the proportion of business income to monetary income, the size of the household and its square,
and indicators of whether household head is an employee, whether he works in an institution not managed
by the government, whether the household is located in a very high margination municipality, whether it is a
nuclear household, and whether the household owns its house. The decomposition was estimated using the Stata
command developed by Jann (2008).
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Dependent variable: (log) Monetary expenditures
ols tsls1 tsls2 liml1 liml2
(log) Monetary 1.3094 1.228 1.2288 0.9469 1.2238
income (150.69)*** (54.74)*** (47.12)*** (4.16)*** (43.77)***
(log) Saving 0.4093 0.383 0.383 0.3744 0.3828
(7.98)*** (5.09)*** (5.10)*** (4.18)*** (5.09)***
(log) Saving -0.0419 -0.0396 -0.0396 -0.0369 -0.0395
squared (-13.28)*** (-8.53)*** (-8.61)*** (-6.09)*** (-8.58)***
Business inc. / -0.0627 -0.0646 -0.0646 -0.0574 -0.0645
Monetary inc. (-2.57)* (-2.26)* (-2.26)* (-0.83) (-2.23)*
Employee -0.0465 -0.0785 -0.0783 -0.1561 -0.0796
(-1.59) (-2.26)* (-2.25)* (-1.11) (-2.21)*
Inst. not 0.0365 0.0099 0.0102 -0.0924 0.0084
managed by govt. (3.25)** -0.48 -0.48 (-0.83) -0.38
Household 0.0034 0.0186 0.0185 0.0564 0.0192
size -1.14 (4.29)*** (3.97)*** -1.78 (3.92)***
HH size -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0008
squared (-0.46) (-2.66)** (-2.62)** (-1.80) (-2.64)**
Nuclear 0.0058 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0215 0.0015
family -1.31 -0.3 -0.3 (-0.90) -0.23
Own house -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0271 -0.0118
(-2.93)** (-2.19)* (-2.16)* (-1.39) (-2.15)*
Credit card 0.0338 0.3883 0.385 1.6391 0.407
(6.03)*** (4.84)*** (3.61)*** -1.63 (3.52)***
Constant -3.8375 -3.0266 -3.0334 -0.4952 -2.9889
(-14.49)*** (-6.79)*** (-7.04)*** (-0.23) (-6.78)***
Observations 6704 6704 6704 6704 6704
R-sq 0.955 0.925 0.925 0.366 0.921
Log Likelihood 3.10E+03 1.60E+03 1.60E+03 -5.50E+03 1.50E+03
F–stat. 5.30E+03 4.50E+03 4.50E+03 641.8891 4.40E+03
Underidentification · · · 60.8874 33.624 60.8874 33.624
p–value · · · 0 0 0 0
Weak Id. · · · 7.0519 17.0855 7.0519 17.0855
10% max IV · · · 36.19 19.93 3.81 8.68
15% max IV · · · 19.71 11.59 2.93 5.33
20% max IV · · · 14.01 8.75 2.54 4.42
25% max IV · · · 11.07 7.25 2.32 3.92
Overidentification · · · 73.7712 1.7275 11.9952 1.6684
p–value · · · 0 0.1887 0.1514 0.1965
z statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 4 – Impact of credit card use on mean household consumption
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expen-
diture
Note: z statistics are based on robustly estimated standard errors. The results in columns 2 and 4 were obtained
using the following instruments: Binary indicator of whether household head receives social security benefits;
binary indicators for household margination level (the excluded category is very low margination); household
savings excluding housing, and household savings excluding housing, health and education expenditures; house-
hold´s head years of schooling and its square. The results in columns 3 and 5 were obtained using the following
instruments: Binary indicator of whether the household is located in a municipality with moderate margination,
and the household´s head year of schooling.
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Dependent variable: (log) Monetary expenditures
Quantiles
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Credit Card 0.4051 0.3132 0.2349 0.1706 0.1291 0.0987 0.0670 0.0403 0.0161
(5.85)*** (6.22)*** (3.42)** (2.62)** (2.46)* (2.3)* (1.8) (1.46) (0.94)
(log) Monetary 1.4468 1.4504 1.4443 1.4264 1.4244 1.4103 1.3967 1.3787 1.3534
income (22.89)*** (27.04)*** (20.51)*** (16.44)*** (19.73)*** (21.68)*** (24.05)*** (22.78)*** (30.42)***
(log) Savings 0.9054 0.8615 0.8230 0.7711 0.7239 0.5949 0.3565 0.2803 -0.0184
(2.13)* (4.8)*** (4.69)*** (4.89)*** (4.05)*** (2.73)** (6.92)*** (1.78) (-0.11)
(log) Savings -0.0723 -0.0695 -0.0667 -0.0628 -0.0601 -0.0523 -0.0390 -0.0342 -0.0175
squared (-3.09)** (-6.86)*** (-6.1)*** (-6.69)*** (-5.88)*** (-4.4)*** (-8.31)*** (-3.45)** (-2.14)*
Business inc. / -0.2459 -0.0263 0.0364 0.0281 0.0060 0.0183 0.0022 -0.0169 -0.0061
Monetary inc. (-0.06) (-0.05) (0.13) (0.15) (0.04) (0.16) (0.02) (-0.17) (-0.09)
Household -0.0043 -0.0104 -0.0185 -0.0157 -0.0174 -0.0149 -0.0101 -0.0068 -0.0024
size (-0.18) (-0.45) (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.76) (-0.7) (-0.56) (-0.43) (-0.18)
HH size 0.0009 0.0013 0.0019 0.0014 0.0014 0.0011 0.0006 0.0003 0.0001
squared (0.63) (0.64) (0.62) (0.7) (0.93) (0.74) (0.52) (0.3) (0.12)
Employee -0.0772 -0.0544 -0.0249 -0.0220 -0.0251 -0.0211 -0.0666 -0.0515 0.0005
(-1.37) (-0.65) (-0.36) (-0.3) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-1.34) (-1.18) (0.02)
Inst. not 0.0762 0.0743 0.0572 0.0677 0.0483 0.0214 0.0118 -0.0014 -0.0035
managed by govt. (0.43) (0.13) (0.06) (0.26) (0.22) (0.1) (0.11) (-0.02) (-0.07)
Nuclear -0.0445 -0.0367 -0.0292 -0.0303 -0.0357 -0.0385 -0.0309 -0.0218 -0.0058
family (-0.8) (-1.01) (-0.75) (-0.79) (-0.87) (-1.04) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-0.35)
Own house -0.0005 -0.0234 -0.0170 -0.0191 -0.0141 -0.0158 -0.0060 0.0003 0.0018
(-0.01) (-0.6) (-0.43) (-0.52) (-0.42) (-0.56) (-0.26) (0.01) (0.12)
Constant -7.5670 -7.3243 -7.0722 -6.6603 -6.3737 -5.6690 -4.4014 -3.9226 -2.3741
(-3.55)*** (-7.22)*** (-6.69)*** (-5.68)*** (-5.67)*** (-4.39)*** (-6.68)*** (-3.87)*** (-2.85)**
N 6704 6704 6704 6704 6704 6704 6704 6704 6704
z statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5 – Quantile Treatment Effects by Decile
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expenditure
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A.2 Figures
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Figure 1 – Difference between the Lorenz curve of households that use credit card and those that do not use
them
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expen-
diture
Note: The Lorenz curves are computed dropping the top and bottom 1% of sample observations, using the
Distributive Analysis Data Package developed by Araar and Duclos (2007).
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Figure 2 – DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux Decomposition
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expen-
diture
Note: The regressors in estimation of the propensity score of using a credit card are years of schooling, house-
hold size, (log) monetary income, (log) savings excluding housing, health and education expenditures and its
square, and indicators of whether the household head works is employed by an institution not managed by the
government, whether the household is located in a municipality with a high or moderate margination index,
and whether it receives government transfers. The confidence interval on the right panel was estimated by
bootstrapping the standard errors of the density difference.
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Figure 3 – Impact of use of credit card on (log) household expenditures by quantile
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the 2010 Mexican Survey of Household’s Income and Expen-
diture
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